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Article 8

Logic, Law and Abortion
by Michael Degnan, Ph.D., and Russ Pannier, Ph.D.

The authors are both on the staff of the Department of Philosophy.
University of St. Thomas. St. Paul, MN.
Abortion. The very word stirs people's emotions. Some feel that the
woman's right to her body is absolute, while others feel the same about the
right to life of the unborn. Heated discussions about abortion rarely attend
to the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court's Roe V. Wade decision which
in effect overturned all state laws restricting abortions. I In this article we
submit the Court's arguments to some techniques of logical analysis. We
hope to show that even relatively simple applications oflogical analysis can
reveal serious weaknesses in the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Roe case.
In Roe the Court struck down a Texas statute which prohibited all
abortions except those performed for the purpose of saving the mother's
life. The Court fashioned a three-part rule for regulation of abortions:
(I) During the first trimester of pregnancy, government must leave the
abortion decision to the medical judgement of the attending physician.
(2) After the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, government may, if it
chooses, pursue its interest in the mother's health by imposing regulations
reasonably related to maternal health.
(3) After the fetus becomes viable (approximately at the end of the second
trimester), government may, if it chooses, pursue its interest in potential life
by prohibiting abortion except where abortion is necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother.
The Court resolved the issue under the 14th Amendment's Due Process
Clause, which provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." The Court's basic theory
was that this clause provides a special degree of protection for
"fundamental" rights. This special degree of protection consists of a
requirement that government demonstrates that any burden it imposes
upon a fundamental tight be a necessary means of promotinga compelling
governmental interest.
This requirement on governmental laws concerning abortion is an
instance of the Court applying a "strict" standard of review in contrast to a
"minimum rationality" standard of review, the standard the Court uses
most of the time. A standard of review is a Court created criterion used to
determine when governmental interests can override personal rights. 3 The
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"minimum rationality" standard requires that governmental regulations
promote permissible objectives in a rational way. The minimum
rationality standard differs from the strict scrutiny standard in two
respects. First, instead of requiring the governmental objective to be
"compelling" (an interest than which there is no other interest of greater
importance), it merely requires that the objective be "permissible" (within
the range of legitimate governmental concerns). Second, instead of
requiring that the means used to promote the objective be "necessary"
(indispensable for), it requires only that the means be "rationally related"
to the objective (basically that it be conceivable that at least one rational
person might think that the means is a useful step toward the objective).
The contrast between the two standards can be easily seen by
considering the consequences of their respective applications. When the
Court applies a minimum rationality standard of review, the governmental
regulation at issue almost always survives constitutional scrutiny. The
Court applies this standard to what it perceives as social welfare or
economic legislation. For example, in 1976 the Court upheld a
Massachusetts law that required state patrol officers to retire at age 50. 4
Judging this to be economic legislation, the Court let the law stand even
though it overrides the rights of the patrol officers.5 On the other hand,
when the strict scrutiny standard of review is applied, the regulation is
almost always invalidated. In 1925, for example, the Court found
unconstitutional an Oregon law requiring children to be ~ent to public
schools, for it deemed the parental decision about where to educate one's
child as a personal right, fundamental to the notion of individualliberty.6
The Court's practice has been to accord special scrutiny protection to
personal rights it considers fundamental. 7
In Roe the Court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review to the
abortion question by means of the following syllogistic argument:
I. Any personal right that is fundamental has special scrutiny protection.
2. The right to have an abortion is a personal right which is fundamental.
3. Hence, the right to have an abortion has special scrutiny protection.
Of course, the argument is deductively valid. But noticing this is only the
beginning. Most legal arguments can be put into a deductively valid form.
Given such a formulation, the interesting question is whether the premises
have been or can be plausibly supported by other arguments.
It is astonishing that the Court paid little attention to the matter of
arguing for premise 2. The nearest thing to an argument in the long
majority opinion is a few lines of a single paragraph in which the Court
says that prohibiting abortions imposes upon pregnant women economic,
physical and psychological detriment. The court writes,
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying
this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable
even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
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imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also
the distress for all concerned , associated with the unwanted child.

The argument seems to come to something like this:
I. All interests whose frustration would cause economic, physical and
psychological burdens are fundamental rights .
2. Frustration of the abortion interest causes economic, physical and
psychological burdens.
3. Hence the abortion interest is a fundamental right.
Now, one of the most problematic aspects of this argument is its first
premise. If it is true, then a great many interests are fundamental rights and
so eligible for special constitutional protection. One can plausibly argue
that, say, denial offree public education or a minimum wage would impose
economic, physical and psychological burdens upon those unable to pay
for such benefits. Yet the Court has been unwilling to hold that the
Constitution requires public education or public welfare .9 Furthermore, it
seems that prohibiting the murder of, say, elderly people who can no
longer care for themselves imposes substantial brudens upon families who
have the primary responsibility for them . But does it follow that such
families have special constitutional permission to take the lives of such
dependents?
Thus, the first premise can be refuted with the logical principle, modus
tollens: If a proposition P is true then another proposition Q is also true.
But Q is false . Hence, P is false as well. As applied to the first premise we
have: If all interests whose frustration would cause economic, physical and
psychological burdens are fundamental rights then welfare and education
interests are fundamental. But welfare and education interests are not
fundamental. Hence, it is not the case that all interests whose frustration
would cause economic, physical and psychological burdens are
fundamental rights.
One might read the Court's citation of earlier privacy decisions as
constituting implicit arguments by analogy. The suggestion would be that
Roe follows by analogy from the facts and holdings of cases such as
Griswold v. Connecticut, the decision holding that the use of contraceptive
devices is entitled to special scrutiny protection under the Due Process
Clause. 1o An argument based upon Griswold might take the following
form :
I. Contraceptives are a means of birth control.
2. Abortion is a means of birth control.
3. Contraceptives are entitled to special constitutional protection.
4. Hence, abortion is entitled to special constitutional protection.
An argument by analogy is only as strong as the degree of relevant
similarity between the objects of comparison. The use of contraceptive
devices and abortion are distinguishable in at least one important respect.
The latter involves termination of a life form; the former does not. Hence,
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the analogy is weak. I I There would have to be support for the claim that
abortion is a privacy interest reaching beyond the kinds of considerations
marshalled by Griswold. Similar points can be made concerning all of the
privacy decisions cited in Roe.
Upon reading the Due Process Clause it may seem to some that the
Court should have upheld the Texas statute since medical science agrees
that from conception the unborn is a member of the human species, i.e., a
human being. Three leading psychologists, Paul Mussen, John Congar,
and Jerome Kagen wrote in a standard tex~, Child Development and
Personality, "The life of each individual begins when a sperm cell from the
father penetrates the wall of an ovum, or egg, from the mother." Alan
Guttmacher, before he served as president of Planned Parenthood, wrote
in a book entitled Having a Baby: A Guidefor Expectant Parents, that the
exact moment of creating a baby was fertilization. Since Webster's Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language as well as the
Oxford English Dictionary define person as a living human being, it seems
that the unborn must be considered a person. From this it should follow
that abortions must be restricted so as not to deprive the unborn person of
life without due process.
The Court, however, did not see things so simply. It refused to resolve
the question of the time when life begins because it found a divergence of
opinion concerning the time of life's beginning. But the word "life"
misleads here, for surely the Court did not mean to deny that the embryo
or the fetus is alive. It is more charitable to read it as asserting that the
question of when human life begins need not be resolved. But since talk of
human life is tantamount to talk of personhood, the Court was apparently
refusing to determine when personhood begins.
However, the Court implicitly denied that the unborn ever becomes a
person prior to birth. For, if there were a point prior to birth at which the
unborn becomes a person then states would be constitutionally required to
protect it from that point onward. This is a conditional proposition of the
form "If P then Q." We know that the court denies Q, for it expressly said
that the states are not required to protect the fetus at any point. The state's
interest in potential human life takes effect only after viability and , even
then, the states are not required to protect that interest. Thus, application
of a simple principle of logic shows that the Court apparently contradicted
itself. On the one hand, it said that it was not deciding the issue of when
personhood begins. On the other hand, it held in effect that whenever
personhood does begin, it certainly does not begin prior to birth.
Now, it is true that the Court apparently believed that at the point of
viability the fetus becomes what might be called a "quasi-person," where
that term connotes the legal status a life form has when government may, if
it chooses, protect it by law. There are at least two logical points which can
be made about this notion of quasi-personhood.
First, the Court offers no argument for its claim that viability is a
relevant criterion for quasi-personhood. But the claim is surely not self56
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evident. Why should ability to survive outside the womb be deemed
relevant on the question of when quasi-personhood begins?
Second, the Court revealed its unstated (and controversial) assumption
that personhood is a comparative, rather than a categorical, concept. That
is, the Court apparently assumed that there are degrees of personhood.
One life form can have the characteristic of personhood in a greater degree
than another life form . The Court implicitly rejected the idea that either a
life form is a person or it is not. In addition, the Court apparently assumed
that the degree of legal protection to which a life form is entitled is a direct
function of the degree of personhood that form possesses.
Now, being unstated assumptions, it is not surprising that the Court
offers no support for them. But they require support. Consequences which
many believe unacceptable apparently follow from them. For example, if
personhood is a matter of degrees, and if legal rights are a function of the
degree of personhood one has, then it is difficult to see why, say, mentally
retarded persons have a right to life. To simply assume without statement
or argument premises which seem to have such startling implications
seems, to say the least, logically careless.
Still one might insist that the Court allowed for the protection of
prenatal life in the third trimester and so afforded some protection to the
unborn . This protection, however, is illusory. The Court held that at the
third trimester abortions can be regulated by the state in the interest of
prenatal life except when an abortion is necessary to preserve the life o r
health of the mother. However, given the Court's definition of health as
expressed in Doe v. Bolton, a companion decision to Roe, the Court in
effect allowed for virtually no restrictions on abortions even in the third
trimester.
The Court wrote that "the medical judgment may be exercised in the
light of all factors- physical, emotional, psychological, familial , and the
woman's age- relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors
may relate to health,"12 According to the Court if a woman can convince
one doctor that her emotional and psychological well being will be
disturbed by giving birth to a child, then the state's interest in protecting
prenatal life can be overridden. It would be a rare case where a doctor
willing to perform an abortion would not be convinced that his patient's
emotional well being required the abortion she asked for. So the
protection the state can give to third trimester prenatal life is severely
limited.
In fact there seems to be an inconsistency here. The Court said that
states can restrict abortion in the 3rd trimester to protect its compelling
state interest in prenatal life at this stage. Yet it effectively denied the state
the means to exercise this protection in any way discernably different from
what was allowed in the 2nd trimester. The Court withdrew with one hand
the protection it appeared to extend with the other. J3
With this examination we have shown that the Roe case has s~rious
logical and constitutional difficulties . Roe can be considered bad
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constitutional law for some of the reasons that our logical analysis has
uncovered . This result might simply be of interest to lawyers and logicians
were it not for the fact that this Court decision has made possible the legal
destruction of over twenty million unborn human lives since 1973.
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